[Whonix-devel] #17094 [Core Tor/Tor]: implicitly set 'UseBridges 1' when using 'Bridge [transport] IP:ORPort [fingerprint]'

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon Jun 13 20:26:57 CEST 2016


#17094: implicitly set 'UseBridges 1' when using 'Bridge [transport] IP:ORPort
[fingerprint]'
--------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  proper        |          Owner:
     Type:  defect        |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium        |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal        |     Resolution:
 Keywords:                |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                |         Points:
 Reviewer:                |        Sponsor:
--------------------------+------------------------------

Comment (by rl1987):

 It seems that `UseBridges` was an `AUTOBOOL` at some point historically,
 but later turned into `BOOL`. Changelog has the following entry for Tor
 0.2.2.29:

 {{{
   o Major bugfixes:
     - Revert the UseBridges option to its behavior before 0.2.2.28-beta.
       When we changed the default behavior to "use bridges if any
       are listed in the torrc", we surprised users who had bridges
       in their torrc files but who didn't actually want to use them.
       Partial resolution for bug 3354.
 }}}
 and the following entry for 0.2.2.28-beta:

 {{{
     - If "UseBridges 1" is set and no bridges are configured, Tor will
       now refuse to build any circuits until some bridges are set.
       If "UseBridges auto" is set, Tor will use bridges if they are
       configured and we are not running as a server, but otherwise will
       make circuits as usual. The new default is "auto". Patch by anonym,
       so the Tails LiveCD can stop automatically revealing you as a Tor
       user on startup.
 }}}
 See 507c1257a4d9c629fefc2adbad8db73607749734 for a changeset that made it
 `AUTOBOOL` and 3b41551b61a604b555891ecc7cb6f8bbde65d128 for changeset that
 reverted it back.

 It appears it was not a good idea after all.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17094#comment:11>
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