[Whonix-devel] [qubes-devel] apt RCE

[Simon Gaiser]

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Patrick Schleizer:
> Many users already upgraded APT in a vulnerable way without ever knowing
> about this issue.

That's probably true. OTOH if you count since the public announcement
from Debian it's only about 29 h. So I think there's also a significant
portion of users who didn't installed new packages in that time (While
apt-get update is also affected, AFAIU, unless you find another bug in
APT this does not enable code execution.).

For those affected we at least offer fresh templates. Of course
depending on the usage of those templates recovering might still require
significant work (sanitizing/recreating affected VMs).

And then there is of course always the possibility that somebody
discovered this bug much earlier.

> What about introducing a security on/off switch that a subset of Qubes
> developers can trigger?
> 
> Before apt-get (or other package manager) does actually anything, a
> simple script could fetch a file from Qubes clearnet domain (and/or
> onion) and ask "is it currently secure to update"?
> 
> In most cases, the server would provide a cryptographically signed file
> by a Qubes developer which says "ok". Otherwise in situations such as
> now with APT security vulnerability DSA 4371-1 a Qubes developer could
> put a cryptographically signed file saying "not safe" there. In such
> cases, updates would be blocked until a new file is provided.
> 
> Things to keep in mind related to such a file: man-in-the-middle attack
> - infinite freeze atttacks; rollback attacks; perhaps more. Can think
> about this more if this sounds interesting.
> 
> Of course there should be options to:
> 
> - disable this mechanism entirely
> - manually override by user
> 
> These override option is useful for:
> 
> - to stay flexible in case of bugs of this mechanism itself and,
> - to not give Qubes developers too much power. No advanced adversary
> should be able to ask Qubes developers to remotely brick all Qubes
> installations (mostly theoretic at this point and not important for now
> but still easy to implement and good to have),
> - other unforeseeable things.

I think blocking updates automatically is probably more problematic
than useful. But ...

> This idea could be seen as a subset of the emergency project news
> mechanism that is currently missing in all distributions. In short:
> distributions have no mechanism to communicate with their users
> effectively in situations such as this one. More info:
> 
> https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Dev/project-news

I think having something like qubes-announce directly integrated into
Qubes is a very interesting idea. (Of course implementing it safely is
tricky).

Simon
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