How to disable stream isolation. Easiest and most common methods only.

Depending on the use case, the easiest and most common methods to disable stream isolation are:

Deactivate uwt Wrappers
Tor Browser Remove Proxy Settings
Deactivate Miscellaneous Proxy Settings

Deactivate uwt Wrappers

The following instructions permanently deactivate all uwt wrappers and remove stream isolation for uwt-wrapped applications system-wide. Consequently, all uwt-wrapped applications revert to the default system networking configuration.

For more granular control of uwt wrapper deactivation, see: Deactivate uwt Stream Isolation Wrapper.

1. Platform specific notice:

Non-Qubes-Whonix^™: No platform specific notice.
Qubes-Whonix^™: In Template. (whonix-workstation-17) ^[1]

2. Open file /etc/uwt.d/50_user.conf in an editor with root rights.

This box uses sudoedit for better security.

sudoedit /etc/uwt.d/50_user.conf

NOTES:

When using Qubes-Whonix, this needs to be done inside the Template.

sudoedit /etc/uwt.d/50_user.conf

After applying this change, shutdown the Template.
All App Qubes based on the Template need to be restarted if they were already running.
This is a general procedure required for Qubes and unspecific to Qubes-Whonix^™.

This is just an example. Other tools could achieve the same goal.
If this example does not work for you or if you are not using Whonix, please refer to this link.

sudoedit /etc/uwt.d/50_user.conf

3. Add.

uwtwrapper_global="0"

4. Save and exit.

5. Check that the changes have taken effect. Run in terminal: uwt_settings_show

It should print

uwt INFO: disabled.

6. Done.

Tor Browser Remove Proxy Settings

Introduction

This configuration results in Tor Browser no longer using proxy settings. With no proxy set, Tor Browser uses the (VM) system's default networking. This is identical to any other application inside Whonix-Workstation^™ that has not been explicitly configured to use Tor via socks proxy settings or a socksifier. This setting is also called transparent torification. ^[2] ^[3]

Why is this difficult?

This is difficult and may not work for you.

To learn why this is difficult, please press on Expand on the right.

Tor Browser, which is developed by upstream, The Tor Project (TPO), an independent entity has hard configured to use Tor as a proxy.

Upstream does not support user using Tor Browser with an additional extra proxy at the end of the chain, i.e.: user → Tor → proxy → destination
Upstream does also not support using Tor Browser with a proxy other than Tor, i.e.: user → custom proxy → destination. This may or may not currently be possible but upstream does not provide documentation on how to do this.
Upstream does also not support using Tor Browser with a VPN instead of Tor, i.e. user → VPN → destination.
Upstream does also not support using Tor Browser with a VPN in addition before Tor, i.e. user → Tor → VPN → destination.

That makes sense from TPO's perspective as a project that maintains a browser that should always connect using the Tor network. Due to that perspective, proxy settings have been removed from Tor Browser to avoid user confusion and accidental misconfiguration. Little attention is spend on custom proxy settings. That, from TPO's perspective is assumed to only make sense for users using a Tor transparent proxy and that are already running Tor on a different computer in their LAN. Only a minority of users is using such configurations.

Because of this organisational and technical background, the highly specialized use case of configuring Tor Browser running inside Whonix-Workstation^™ to use an additional proxy (user -> Tor -> proxy -> destination) is difficult to accomplish.

To learn more about this organisational and technical background see also Linux User Experience versus Commercial Operating Systems

COMMUNITY SUPPORT ONLY : THIS wiki CHAPTER only is only supported by the community. Whonix developers are very unlikely to provide free support for this content. See Community Support for further information, including implications and possible alternatives.

Note: This action will break both Stream Isolation for Tor Browser and Tor Browser's SOCKS username for a request based on first party domain feature. This worsens the web fingerprint and leads to pseudonymous (not anonymous) connections. To mitigate these risks, consider using More than one Tor Browser in Whonix, or preferably Multiple Whonix-Workstation^™.

Local socks proxy Method

This method works for removal of proxy settings but is rather lengthy and complicated. In case the user wants to have a look anyhow, please press on Expand on the right.

Since other methods to configure Tor Browser to use system default networking are broken due to Tor Browser changes by upstream, this new local socks proxy method stops anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor local port 9150 redirection to Whonix-Gateway^™ 9150 (where a Tor SocksPort is listening). As a replacement, a local socks proxy listens on Whonix-Workstation local port 9150 which then forwards the traffic using system default networking. In result, if the user is using a VPN inside Whonix-Workstation or in a VPN-Gateway wretched between Whonix-Gateway^™ and Whonix-Workstation, Tor Browser would use the VPN.

In this documentation, Dante is used as a local socks proxy. Development notes are kept on Dev/Dante.

1. Legacy notices.

New users, that did not apply instructions from this page again: No special notice.
Existing users: See below.

A few settings need to be undone.

A) Previous changes to /etc/environment as documented previously for other methods need to be undone.
B) Tor Browser needs to be re-installed. This is because undoing the previous configuration is difficult and undocumented.

2. Stop default anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor service for port 9150.

Non-Qubes-Whonix: In Whonix-Workstation.
Qubes-Whonix: In whonix-workstation-17 Template.

sudo systemctl stop anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor_autogen_port_9150.socket sudo systemctl stop anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor_autogen_port_9150.service sudo systemctl stop anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor_autogen__run_anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor_127.0.0.1_9150.sock.socket sudo systemctl stop anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor_autogen__run_anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor_127.0.0.1_9150.sock.service

3. Prevent default anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor systemd unit from starting.

Non-Qubes-Whonix: In Whonix-Workstation.
Qubes-Whonix: In whonix-workstation-17 Template.

sudo systemctl mask anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor_autogen_port_9150.socket sudo systemctl mask anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor_autogen_port_9150.service sudo systemctl mask anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor_autogen__run_anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor_127.0.0.1_9150.sock.socket sudo systemctl mask anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor_autogen__run_anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor_127.0.0.1_9150.sock.service

4. Install the local socks proxy server.

Non-Qubes-Whonix: In Whonix-Workstation.
Qubes-Whonix: In whonix-workstation-17 Template.

A) Add Debian source repository.

Open file /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian-src.list in an editor with root rights.

This box uses sudoedit for better security.

sudoedit /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian-src.list

NOTES:

When using Qubes-Whonix, this needs to be done inside the Template.

sudoedit /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian-src.list

After applying this change, shutdown the Template.
All App Qubes based on the Template need to be restarted if they were already running.
This is a general procedure required for Qubes and unspecific to Qubes-Whonix^™.

This is just an example. Other tools could achieve the same goal.
If this example does not work for you or if you are not using Whonix, please refer to this link.

sudoedit /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian-src.list

Paste.

deb-src https://deb.debian.org/debian bookworm main contrib non-free

Save and exit.

sudo apt update

B) Install build dependencies.

sudo apt build-dep dante-server

C) Get dante source code.

apt-get source dante-server

D) Open the dante accesscheck.c source file.

mousepad ~/dante-1.4.2+dfsg/sockd/accesscheck.c

Paste the contents. Here we rewrite the authentication method to always return true. For the reasons see Dev/Dante.

/* * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, * 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 * Inferno Nettverk A/S, Norway. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. The above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following * disclaimer must appear in all copies of the software, derivative works * or modified versions, and any portions thereof, aswell as in all * supporting documentation. * 2. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * This product includes software developed by * Inferno Nettverk A/S, Norway. * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * Inferno Nettverk A/S requests users of this software to return to * * Software Distribution Coordinator or sdc@inet.no * Inferno Nettverk A/S * Oslo Research Park * Gaustadalléen 21 * NO-0349 Oslo * Norway * * any improvements or extensions that they make and grant Inferno Nettverk A/S * the rights to redistribute these changes. * */ #include "common.h" static const char rcsid[] = "$Id: accesscheck.c,v 1.89 2013/10/27 15:24:42 karls Exp $"; int usermatch(auth, userlist) const authmethod_t *auth; const linkedname_t *userlist; { /* const char *function = "usermatch()"; */ const char *name; if ((name = authname(auth)) == NULL) return 0; /* no username, no match. */ do if (strcmp(name, userlist->name) == 0) break; while ((userlist = userlist->next) != NULL); if (userlist == NULL) return 0; /* no match. */ return 1; } int groupmatch(auth, grouplist) const authmethod_t *auth; const linkedname_t *grouplist; { const char *function = "groupmatch()"; const char *username; struct passwd *pw; struct group *groupent; SASSERTX(grouplist != NULL); if ((username = authname(auth)) == NULL) return 0; /* no username, no match. */ /* * First check the primary group of the user against grouplist. * If the groupname given there matches, we don't need to go through * all users in the list of group. */ if ((pw = getpwnam(username)) != NULL && (groupent = getgrgid(pw->pw_gid)) != NULL) { const linkedname_t *listent = grouplist; do if (strcmp(groupent->gr_name, listent->name) == 0) return 1; while ((listent = listent->next) != NULL); } else { if (pw == NULL) slog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: unknown username \"%s\"", function, username); else if (groupent == NULL) slog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: unknown primary groupid %ld", function, (long)pw->pw_gid); } /* * Go through grouplist, matching username against each groupmember of * all the groups in grouplist. */ do { char **groupname; if ((groupent = getgrnam(grouplist->name)) == NULL) { swarn("%s: unknown groupname \"%s\"", function, grouplist->name); continue; } groupname = groupent->gr_mem; while (*groupname != NULL) { if (strcmp(username, *groupname) == 0) return 1; /* match. */ ++groupname; } } while ((grouplist = grouplist->next) != NULL); return 0; } #if HAVE_LDAP int ldapgroupmatch(auth, rule) const authmethod_t *auth; const rule_t *rule; { const char *function = "ldapgroupmatch()"; const linkedname_t *grouplist; const char *username; char *userdomain, *groupdomain; int retval; if ((username = authname(auth)) == NULL) return 0; /* no username, no match. */ #if !HAVE_GSSAPI if (!rule->state.ldap.ldapurl) SERRX(rule->state.ldap.ldapurl != NULL); #endif /* !HAVE_GSSAPI */ if ((userdomain = strchr(username, '@')) != NULL) ++userdomain; if (userdomain == NULL && *rule->state.ldap.domain == NUL && rule->state.ldap.ldapurl == NULL) { slog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: cannot check ldap group membership for user %s: " "user has no domain postfix and no ldap url is defined", function, username); return 0; } if ((retval = ldap_user_is_cached(username)) >= 0) return retval; /* go through grouplist, matching username against members of each group. */ grouplist = rule->ldapgroup; do { char groupname[MAXNAMELEN]; slog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: checking if user %s is member of ldap group %s", function, username, grouplist->name); STRCPY_ASSERTLEN(groupname, grouplist->name); if ((groupdomain = strchr(groupname, '@')) != NULL) { *groupdomain = NUL; /* separates groupname from groupdomain. */ ++groupdomain; } if (groupdomain != NULL && userdomain != NULL) { if (strcmp(groupdomain, userdomain) != 0 && strcmp(groupdomain, "") != 0) { slog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: userdomain \"%s\" does not match groupdomain " "\"%s\" and groupdomain is not default domain. " "Trying next entry", function, userdomain, groupdomain); continue; } } if (ldapgroupmatches(username, userdomain, groupname, groupdomain, rule)){ cache_ldap_user(username, 1); return 1; } } while ((grouplist = grouplist->next) != NULL); cache_ldap_user(username, 0); return 0; } #endif /* HAVE_LDAP */ int accesscheck(s, auth, src, dst, emsg, emsgsize) int s; authmethod_t *auth; const struct sockaddr_storage *src, *dst; char *emsg; size_t emsgsize; { int match, authresultisfixed; match = 1; /* * HACK-FORK-EDIT-OK */ return match; }

E) Change directory into the dante source code folder.

pushd dante-1.4.2+dfsg

F) Build the Debian package.

dpkg-buildpackage -b --no-sign

E) Change directory back to the home folder.

popd

F) Install the modified dante package.

sudo dpkg -i dante-server_1.4.2+dfsg-7_amd64.deb

G) Block updates of dante-server.

sudo apt-mark hold dante-server

5. Open file /etc/danted.conf in an editor with root rights.

This box uses sudoedit for better security.

sudoedit /etc/danted.conf

NOTES:

When using Qubes-Whonix, this needs to be done inside the Template.

sudoedit /etc/danted.conf

After applying this change, shutdown the Template.
All App Qubes based on the Template need to be restarted if they were already running.
This is a general procedure required for Qubes and unspecific to Qubes-Whonix^™.

This is just an example. Other tools could achieve the same goal.
If this example does not work for you or if you are not using Whonix, please refer to this link.

sudoedit /etc/danted.conf

6. Local socks proxy configuration.

Non-Qubes-Whonix: In Whonix-Workstation.
Qubes-Whonix: In whonix-workstation-17 Template.

Delete all contents from the file and replace it with the following configuration.

debug: 0 logoutput: stderr internal: 127.0.0.1 port = 9150 external: eth0 socksmethod: none username clientmethod: none user.privileged: root user.notprivileged: root user.libwrap: root # allow connections only from localhost client pass { from: 127.0.0.1/8 port 1-65535 to: 0.0.0.0/0 log: connect disconnect error # comment on some logs if you don't want to keep them } socks pass { from: 0.0.0.0/0 to: 0.0.0.0/0 command: bind connect udpassociate log: error connect disconnect iooperation }

7. Restart the local socks proxy.

This is to apply the changed configuration and to test if the configuration is valid.

Non-Qubes-Whonix: In Whonix-Workstation.
Qubes-Whonix: In whonix-workstation-17 Template.

sudo systemctl restart danted.service

8. tb-starter Configuration

Non-Qubes-Whonix: In Whonix-Workstation.
Qubes-Whonix: In whonix-workstation-17 Template.

Stop Tor from using unix domain socket files for socks so it uses socks on IP 127.0.0.1 port 9150 instead.

Open file /etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf in an editor with root rights.

This box uses sudoedit for better security.

sudoedit /etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf

NOTES:

When using Qubes-Whonix, this needs to be done inside the Template.

sudoedit /etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf

After applying this change, shutdown the Template.
All App Qubes based on the Template need to be restarted if they were already running.
This is a general procedure required for Qubes and unspecific to Qubes-Whonix^™.

This is just an example. Other tools could achieve the same goal.
If this example does not work for you or if you are not using Whonix, please refer to this link.

sudoedit /etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf

Paste.

unset TOR_SOCKS_IPC_PATH

Save and exit.

9. Platform specific notice:

Non-Qubes-Whonix: No special notice required.
Qubes-Whonix: Shutdown Template. Once done, restart App Qube.

10. Start Tor Browser.

Non-Qubes-Whonix: In Whonix-Workstation.
Qubes-Whonix: In Whonix-Workstation App Qube.

torbrowser

Tor Browser should now be using system default networking thanks to the local socks proxy.

No additional configuration of Tor Browser is required.

11. Done.

Older Methods:

For older methods, which might be broken due to Tor Browser changes by upstream, please press on Expand on the right.

To enable transparent torification (no proxy setting), set the TOR_TRANSPROXY=1 environment variable. There are several methods, but the simplest is the /etc/environment Method.

Note: Choose only one method to enable transparent torification.

/etc/environment Method

This will apply to the whole environment, including any possible custom locations of Tor Browser installation folders. ^[4]

1. Platform specific notice.

Non-Qubes-Whonix^™: No platform specific notice.
Qubes-Whonix^™: In Template. (whonix-workstation-17)

2. Open file /etc/environment in an editor with root rights.

This box uses sudoedit for better security.

sudoedit /etc/environment

NOTES:

When using Qubes-Whonix, this needs to be done inside the Template.

sudoedit /etc/environment

After applying this change, shutdown the Template.
All App Qubes based on the Template need to be restarted if they were already running.
This is a general procedure required for Qubes and unspecific to Qubes-Whonix^™.

This is just an example. Other tools could achieve the same goal.
If this example does not work for you or if you are not using Whonix, please refer to this link.

sudoedit /etc/environment

3. Add the following line.

TOR_TRANSPROXY=1 ## newline at the end

4. Save and exit.

5. Reboot.

Reboot is required to make changes to configuration file /etc/environment take effect.

6. Done.

/etc/environment method configuration has been completed.

Tor Browser Settings Changes

This step is required since Tor Browser 10. ^[5]

1. Platform specific notice.

Non-Qubes-Whonix: No platform specific notice.
Qubes-Whonix: In App Qube. (anon-whonix)

2. Tor Browser → URL bar → Type: about:config → Press Enter key. → search for and modify

3. network.dns.disabled → set to false

4. extensions.torbutton.launch_warning → set to false

Undo

Reverting this change is undocumented. Simply unsetting that environment variable will not work due to Tor Browser limitations. The easiest way to undo this setting is to install a fresh instance of Tor Browser (please contribute to these instructions)!

Command Line Method

1. Platform specific notice:

Non-Qubes-Whonix: No platform specific notice.
Qubes-Whonix: In App Qube. (anon-whonix)

2. Navigate to the Tor Browser folder.

cd ~/.tb/tor-browser

3. Every time Tor Browser is started, run the following command to set the TOR_TRANSPROXY=1 environment variable.

TOR_TRANSPROXY=1 ./start-tor-browser.desktop

4. Done.

start-tor-browser Method

This only applies to a single instance of the Tor Browser folder that is configured. This method may not persist when Tor Browser is updated.

1. Platform specific notice:

Non-Qubes-Whonix: No platform specific notice.
Qubes-Whonix: In App Qube. (anon-whonix)

2. Find and open start-tor-browser in the Tor Browser folder with an editor.

This is most likely found in ~/.tb/tor-browser/Browser/start-tor-browser below #!/usr/bin/env bash.

3. Set.

export TOR_TRANSPROXY=1

4. Done.

start-tor-browser Method configuration has been completed.

Ignore Tor Button's Open Network Settings

Whonix has disabled the Open Network Settings... menu option in Tor Button. Read the footnote for further information. ^[6]

Deactivate Miscellaneous Proxy Settings

On the Stream Isolation page, there is a list of applications that are pre-configured to use socks proxy settings via application configuration files. To disable this the Whonix system default must be removed from the application's settings.

TODO: document and expand.

Remove proxy settings for APT repository files.

1. Platform specific notice:

Non-Qubes-Whonix^™: No platform specific notice.
Qubes-Whonix^™: In Template. (whonix-workstation-17)

2. If you previously onionized any repositories, that has to be undone; see Onionizing Repositories.

3. Remove any mention of tor+ in file /etc/apt/sources.list (if it was previously configured; that file is empty by default in Whonix / Kicksecure) or any file in folder /etc/apt/sources.list.d.

4. Open file /etc/apt/sources.list /etc/apt/sources.list.d/* in an editor with root rights.

This box uses sudoedit for better security.

sudoedit /etc/apt/sources.list /etc/apt/sources.list.d/*

NOTES:

When using Qubes-Whonix, this needs to be done inside the Template.

sudoedit /etc/apt/sources.list /etc/apt/sources.list.d/*

After applying this change, shutdown the Template.
All App Qubes based on the Template need to be restarted if they were already running.
This is a general procedure required for Qubes and unspecific to Qubes-Whonix^™.

This is just an example. Other tools could achieve the same goal.
If this example does not work for you or if you are not using Whonix, please refer to this link.

sudoedit /etc/apt/sources.list /etc/apt/sources.list.d/*

5. Remove any mention of tor+.

6. Done.

The process of removing proxy settings from APT repository files is now complete.

Remove proxy settings for Tor Browser Downloader by Whonix.

1. Platform specific notice:

Non-Qubes-Whonix: No platform specific notice.
Qubes-Whonix: In Template. (whonix-workstation-17) ^[7]

2. Open file /etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf in an editor with root rights.

This box uses sudoedit for better security.

sudoedit /etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf

NOTES:

When using Qubes-Whonix, this needs to be done inside the Template.

sudoedit /etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf

After applying this change, shutdown the Template.
All App Qubes based on the Template need to be restarted if they were already running.
This is a general procedure required for Qubes and unspecific to Qubes-Whonix^™.

This is just an example. Other tools could achieve the same goal.
If this example does not work for you or if you are not using Whonix, please refer to this link.

sudoedit /etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf

3. Paste. ^[8] ^[9]

TB_NO_TOR_CON_CHECK=1 CURL_PROXY="--fail"

4. Save and exit.

5. Done.

Proxy settings have been removed from Tor Browser Downloader by Whonix (and Mullvad Browser by Kicksecure developers).

For some applications, this is impossible:

These applications can only talk to Tor Onion Services directly and cannot be configured to use the system default. Therefore you can only deactivate sdwdate and/or not use applications like OnionShare and Ricochet IM.

Footnotes[edit]

↑ Qubes-Whonix users note: Or alternatively in App Qube.

1. Create folder /usr/local/etc/uwt.d.
sudo mkdir -p /usr/local/etc/uwt.d
2. Open with root rights: sudoedit /usr/local/etc/uwt.d/50_user.conf
↑ This term was coined in context of a Tor Transparent Proxy (.onion). It acts as a simple gateway that routes all connections through Tor, but does not provide Stream Isolation.
↑ If these settings are changed, Tor Button would previously show a red sign and state "Tor Disabled" when a mouse was hovered over it.
↑ Unless this environment variable is manually unset before starting Tor Browser.
↑
↑
The regular Tor Browser Bundle from The Tor Project (without Whonix) allows networking settings to changed inside Tor via the Open Network Settings menu option. It has the same effect as editing Tor's config file torrc. In Whonix, the environment variable export TOR_NO_DISPLAY_NETWORK_SETTINGS=1 has been set to disable the Tor Browser → Open Network Settings... menu item. It is not useful and confusing to have in the Whonix-Workstation because:
- In Whonix, there is only limited access to Tor's control port (see onion-grater, a Tor Control Port Filter Proxy, design documentation for more information).
- For security reasons, Tor must be manually configured in /usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf on Whonix-Gateway, and not from Whonix-Workstation (see VPN/Tunnel support for more information).
↑
Qubes-Whonix users note: In App Qube (whonix-workstation-17) could also use file /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf instead.
1. Create folder /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d (if using Tor Browser Downloader by Whonix developers) and optionally /usr/local/etc/mullvadbrowser.d (if using Mullvad Browser by Kicksecure developers).
mkdir -p /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d
mkdir -p /usr/local/etc/mullvadbrowser.d
2. Open file /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf in an editor with root rights.
Non-Qubes-Whonix^™

This box uses sudoedit for better security.
sudoedit /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf

Qubes-Whonix^™

NOTES:

When using Qubes-Whonix, this needs to be done inside the Template.

sudoedit /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf

After applying this change, shutdown the Template.

All App Qubes based on the Template need to be restarted if they were already running.

This is a general procedure required for Qubes and unspecific to Qubes-Whonix^™.

Others and Alternatives

This is just an example. Other tools could achieve the same goal.

If this example does not work for you or if you are not using Whonix, please refer to this link.

sudoedit /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf
And/or:
sudoedit /usr/local/etc/mullvadbrowser.d/50_user.conf
↑ TB_NO_TOR_CON_CHECK=1 needs to be set because there is no filtered Tor ControlPort access when Whonix tunnel firewall is enabled, which would break tb-updater's Tor connectivity check.
↑ By tb-updater default, if unset, variable CURL_PROXY will be dynamically set to a Tor SocksPort on Whonix-Gateway^™. For example to CURL_PROXY="--proxy socks5h://user:password@10.137.6.1:9115".
By utilizing a curl parameter we are using anyhow -- CURL_PROXY="--fail" -- the environment variable can be disabled even if it is technically still set. This will result in downloading via the system's default networking.

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[uwt-in-app-qube-1] Qubes-Whonix users note: Or alternatively in App Qube.

1. Create folder /usr/local/etc/uwt.d.
sudo mkdir -p /usr/local/etc/uwt.d
2. Open with root rights: sudoedit /usr/local/etc/uwt.d/50_user.conf

[2] This term was coined in context of a Tor Transparent Proxy (.onion). It acts as a simple gateway that routes all connections through Tor, but does not provide Stream Isolation.

[3] If these settings are changed, Tor Button would previously show a red sign and state "Tor Disabled" when a mouse was hovered over it.

[4] Unless this environment variable is manually unset before starting Tor Browser.

[5] 
https://forums.whonix.org/t/tor-browser-10-without-tor/10313

https://forums.whonix.org/t/tor-browser-not-working-user-tor-vpn-internet/10385

https://forums.whonix.org/t/tor-browser-infinite-tab-opening-when-enabling-tor-transproxy-when-using-it-with-a-vpn/12791

[6] ttps://forums.whonix.org/t/tor-browser-10-without-tor/10313

[7] ttps://forums.whonix.org/t/tor-browser-not-working-user-tor-vpn-internet/10385

[8] ttps://forums.whonix.org/t/tor-browser-infinite-tab-opening-when-enabling-tor-transproxy-when-using-it-with-a-vpn/12791

[6] The regular Tor Browser Bundle from The Tor Project (without Whonix) allows networking settings to changed inside Tor via the Open Network Settings menu option. It has the same effect as editing Tor's config file torrc. In Whonix, the environment variable export TOR_NO_DISPLAY_NETWORK_SETTINGS=1 has been set to disable the Tor Browser → Open Network Settings... menu item. It is not useful and confusing to have in the Whonix-Workstation because:
In Whonix, there is only limited access to Tor's control port (see onion-grater, a Tor Control Port Filter Proxy, design documentation for more information).

For security reasons, Tor must be manually configured in /usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf on Whonix-Gateway, and not from Whonix-Workstation (see VPN/Tunnel support for more information).

[10] In Whonix, there is only limited access to Tor's control port (see onion-grater, a Tor Control Port Filter Proxy, design documentation for more information).

[11] For security reasons, Tor must be manually configured in /usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf on Whonix-Gateway, and not from Whonix-Workstation (see VPN/Tunnel support for more information).

[usr-local-etc-torbrowser-dot-d-7] Qubes-Whonix users note: In App Qube (whonix-workstation-17) could also use file /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf instead.

1. Create folder /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d (if using Tor Browser Downloader by Whonix developers) and optionally /usr/local/etc/mullvadbrowser.d (if using Mullvad Browser by Kicksecure developers).
mkdir -p /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d
mkdir -p /usr/local/etc/mullvadbrowser.d
2. Open file /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf in an editor with root rights.

Non-Qubes-Whonix^™

This box uses sudoedit for better security.
sudoedit /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf

Qubes-Whonix^™

NOTES:

When using Qubes-Whonix, this needs to be done inside the Template.

sudoedit /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf

After applying this change, shutdown the Template.

All App Qubes based on the Template need to be restarted if they were already running.

This is a general procedure required for Qubes and unspecific to Qubes-Whonix^™.

Others and Alternatives

This is just an example. Other tools could achieve the same goal.

If this example does not work for you or if you are not using Whonix, please refer to this link.

sudoedit /usr/local/etc/torbrowser.d/50_user.conf

And/or:
sudoedit /usr/local/etc/mullvadbrowser.d/50_user.conf

[13] When using Qubes-Whonix, this needs to be done inside the Template.

[14] After applying this change, shutdown the Template.

[15] All App Qubes based on the Template need to be restarted if they were already running.

[16] This is a general procedure required for Qubes and unspecific to Qubes-Whonix^™.

[17] This is just an example. Other tools could achieve the same goal.

[18] If this example does not work for you or if you are not using Whonix, please refer to this link.

[8] TB_NO_TOR_CON_CHECK=1 needs to be set because there is no filtered Tor ControlPort access when Whonix tunnel firewall is enabled, which would break tb-updater's Tor connectivity check.

[9] By tb-updater default, if unset, variable CURL_PROXY will be dynamically set to a Tor SocksPort on Whonix-Gateway^™. For example to CURL_PROXY="--proxy socks5h://user:password@10.137.6.1:9115".
By utilizing a curl parameter we are using anyhow -- CURL_PROXY="--fail" -- the environment variable can be disabled even if it is technically still set. This will result in downloading via the system's default networking.

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

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