Qubes Disposables

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How to use Disposables in Qubes-Whonix.

A few usability issues in Disposables affect anonymity. If the risks are unknown to the user, then first carefully read this page.

What are Disposables?

In the Qubes Template model, any changes made to a root filesystem of an App Qube are lost upon reboot. This is advantageous for several reasons: it saves time and disk space, and allows faster, centralized updates for applications that are usually found inside the root filesystem. However, certain directories are designed to persist between reboots in order to store files and settings. These directories are stored in /rw, including /home/user and /usr/local as well as additional directories defined by "bind directory" settings.

Qubes does not have a built-in snapshot capability like VirtualBox that can completely revert all changes back to a previous VM state. In other words, no method exists within App Qubes to reverse changes made to the persistent file system without implementing some type of custom solution. To ensure that all filesystem changes are discarded after a session, Qubes offers Disposables. When a Disposable is shutdown, the VM is removed from Qubes and all related VM images are deleted from the host filesystem. This method is not yet amnesic and should not be relied upon for anti-forensics!

While Disposables ensure that files do not persist without user intervention, the downside is the user can no longer decide whether or not the current VM state should be kept or destroyed; users must choose beforehand to use a standard App Qube or a Disposable.

Table: Qubes R4 Inheritance and Persistence

	Inheritance	Persistence
Template	n/a	Everything
App Qubes	/etc/skel/ to /home/	/rw/ (includes /home/ and bind-dirs)
Disposable Template	/etc/skel/ to /home/	/rw/ (includes /home/, /usr/local and bind-dirs)
Disposable	/rw/ (includes /home/, /usr/local and bind-dirs)	Nothing

The Layered Disposable System

Qubes uses a two-layered approach to Disposables. At the core of the system is a Template upon which a Disposable Template is based. Every time a new Disposable is launched it is based on the Disposable Template - hence, two layers. In a standard Qubes-Whonix installation:

• The Whonix-Workstation^™ default Template is whonix-workstation-17.
• The Whonix-Workstation default Disposable Template is called whonix-workstation-17-dvm.
• Each Whonix-Workstation default Disposable (disp1, disp2, ...) is based on whonix-workstation-17-dvm.

Once a Disposable Template is created, its /home/user/ directory can be customized independently of the Template. In this special case, the Disposable Template will continue to inherit changes from the base Template's root filesystem (like package updates), but user files in /home/user/ will persist independently.

It is possible to have multiple Disposable Templates and Disposables at the same time. Any App Qube can be enabled for use as a template for Disposables, by setting its template_for_dispvms property.

In Qubes R4, Qubes-Whonix 17's default Disposable Template (whonix-workstation-17-dvm) can be easily created using salt and will have this property set.

Disposable Traffic Stream Isolation

Disposables work especially well with Whonix-Gateway^™. All Disposable traffic is stream-isolated from the traffic of other VMs running in parallel.

Warnings

Table: Disposable Warnings

Category	Warning
Amnesic Capability	All changes to a Qubes Disposable's file system are discarded upon shutdown. However, Disposables are similar to snapshots insofar as they can leave traces of their activity on storage and in memory. These traces may be later recoverable through data forensics. This is Qubes issue. The feature requests exist since year 2013. The issue is unspecific to Whonix. See footnote for a list of references and open, unresolved (and mostly stalled) Qubes development tickets. At time of writing, there is no shortcut, substitute or workaround available that users can easily use to get Qubes Anti-Forensics capabilities. This is elaborated in developers chapter Forensic Considerations and Anti-forensics Claims. This is further justification for using full disk encryption on the Qubes host and completely shutting down the system when it is not in use. Laptop users may wish to remove batteries to ensure that power to the RAM is definitely disconnected.
Ephemeral Whonix-Gateway ProxyVMs	Using Disposables for both the Whonix Gateway and Workstation in Qubes does not increase security without any corresponding privacy downside, for the following reasons: Disposables are not amnesic. In practice this means traces of their activity can be left on storage or in memory, making them vulnerable to forensic operations. Using a Disposable for the Whonix-Gateway results in non-persistent entry guards to the Tor network; behavior unlike the default configurations for Whonix, Tor, and the Tor Browser Bundle. Mathematically speaking, end-to-end correlation attacks are more likely to succeed when a user chooses many random entry and exit points in the Tor network, rather than semi-permanent entry guards which are only rotated every few months. See additional footnote.
Spawning Disposables	Word definition. What does Spawning Disposables mean? For example using qvm-open-in-dvm or right click context menu in certain file manages for which Qubes provides integration. If a Disposable is spawned from within a VM that is not connected to Whonix-Gateway, the new Disposable may route its traffic over clearnet. The reason is because Disposables inherit their NetVMs from the calling VM, or the calling VM's dispvm_netvm setting (if different). The dispvm_netvm setting can be configured per VM via: dom0 → Qube Manager → VM Settings → Advanced → NetVM for Disposable If the calling VM is connected to Whonix-Gateway, this step is not necessary and the Disposable's traffic will be routed over Tor. See: Whonix default NetVM settings fixes.
Named Disposables: Manual Shutdown	Unlike Disposables spawned from the Whonix default Disposable Template, named Disposables do not automatically shutdown when the first user process is terminated. If a fresh Named Disposable is needed, users must first shutdown the named Disposable and start a new Disposable instance. Failure to do so could lead to session data from previous activities persisting until the Disposable is properly shutdown.
Tor Browser in a Disposable Template	Do not start Tor Browser in a Disposable Template! For reasons why, see: Running Tor Browser in Qubes Template. Only start Tor Browser in App Qubes or Disposables, see: Start Tor Browser in a Disposable.
Tor Browser Updater in a Disposable Template	Do not start Tor Browser Updater in a Disposable Template! For reasons why, see: tb-updater in Qubes Disposable Template. Instead, run Tor Browser Downloader by Whonix developers in Whonix-Workstation Template (whonix-workstation-17).
Tor Browser Version	When using Disposables, use the Tor Browser Internal Updater daily to check the browser is up-to-date! To learn about recent Tor Browser versions, follow The Tor Project blog. Tor Browser's version number can also be checked manually: Tor Browser → Menu → Help → About Tor Browser. See Keep Tor Browser Up-to-date.
Verify Disposable Status	Use caution when spawning a Disposable for the first time when it is based on a freshly created Disposable Template. There could be serious consequences if an application like Tor Browser was started in a Disposable Template and used extensively for web browsing. Compromise of the Disposable Template would mean all Disposables spawned from it would be similarly compromised; see Running Tor Browser in Qubes Template. To check the freshly started VM is a Disposable, verify it is named [disp xxxx] where xxxx is the number assigned to that Disposable. If the Disposable Template was started instead, then it should be shut down immediately. If the Disposable Template is ever inadvertently used for a dangerous activity like web browsing, then delete it and create a new one.
Whonix-Gateway Linkability	The Tor Project developer Teor has stated that Tor caches DNS, HS descriptors, pre-emptive circuits, etc. which may lead to linkage between App Qubes and Disposables sharing the same Whonix-Gateway. The extent to which this is a threat for Whonix users has now been documented; see Multiple Whonix-Workstation.

Setup

Note: Examples below reference GUI steps whenever possible.

Create a Whonix Default Disposable Template based on Whonix-Workstation

1. Update Qubes-Whonix.

2. Open a dom0 terminal: Qubes App Launcher (blue/grey "Q") → System Tools → Xfce Terminal

3. Create whonix-workstation-17-dvm Disposable Template.

sudo qubesctl state.sls qvm.whonix-workstation-dvm

4. Done.

Qubes-Whonix Dispoables are now ready for use.

Create a Named Whonix Disposable based on Whonix-Workstation

Optional.

Nearly all users can skip steps 1 and 2 below. A specific use case for Disposable naming conventions has not (yet) been identified.

A named Disposable is a Disposable with a fixed name.

A named Disposable is not a Disposable Template.

Therefore when selecting a name for a named Disposable, do not include -dvm when naming Disposables! This is because dvm has a different meaning. The meaning of dvm is Disposable Template. A named Disposable with dvm in it's name would be a contradiction.

Tor Browser will not be inherited from Whonix-Workstation Template (whonix-workstation-17) if this advice is ignored.

Before creating named Disposables, familiarize yourself with their behavior and read all relevant warnings. Failure to do so could lead to unwanted behavior which occurs without the user's knowledge.

1. Create a Disposable called anon-whonix-disp based on the whonix-workstation-17-dvm Template.

In dom0 run.

qvm-create -C DispVM -l red --template whonix-workstation-17-dvm anon-whonix-disp

2. Launch Xfce Terminal in the Disposable.

qvm-run -a anon-whonix-disp xfce4-terminal

TODO - Investigate use cases for this procedure:

• A named Disposable might be useful for a larger root/private image.
• It might also be useful for activities such as building Templates in a Disposable.

Customization

Disposable Templates

Extra caution must be exercised when customizing a Disposable Template. From a privacy perspective, it is ideal to have a Disposable Template that is indistinguishable from any other Whonix-Workstation. If changes are made to the Disposable Template, these may link all of the Disposables via a uniquely generated fingerprint should they be compromised independently. Risky changes include, but are not limited to:

• Installation of obscure programs;
• Uncommon configuration settings; or
• The placement of unique data files.

Always keep in mind the Disposable will likely be exposed to the greatest Internet threats.

Tor Browser is specifically designed to prevent website fingerprinting or identification based on the user's browser fingerprint. It is safest to run Tor Browser in its stock configuration so the fingerprint is less unique, due to commonality with the larger Tor Browser user pool. Each individual browser change can significantly worsen the fingerprint because of the associated entropy, so only make alterations if the impacts are known. See also: tb-updater in Qubes Disposable Template.

A decision must be made in advance whether to disable JavaScript by default. There is a usability-security trade-off to consider: fingerprinting and usability is worsened by disabled JavaScript, but this provides better protection against vulnerabilities. Conversely, enabled JavaScript improves usability and increases the risk of exploitation, but the browser fingerprint is (likely) more common.

Tor Browser in Disposable Template

For most users, Tor Browser customizations in the Disposable Template or Template are discouraged. Advanced users who wish to customize the Disposable Template despite the risks should follow these steps.

Applications other than Torbrowser in Disposable Template

Customization is completely optional. Only files in /home/user (or more generally, in /rw) can be customized in a Disposable Template.

1. Launch the application in the Disposable Template.

Either open dom0 terminal and run.

qvm-run -a whonix-workstation-17-dvm <app>

Or use Qube Manager:

dom0 → Qube Manager → right-click 'whonix-workstation-17-dvm' → Run command in qube → type name of the <app>

2. Customize application settings.

Customize the application as per normal procedures.

3. Exit the application.

If required, save application-specific settings, then exit the application so settings are stored on the disk.

4. Shutdown the Disposable Template.

Either use a dom0 terminal.

qvm-shutdown whonix-workstation-17-dvm

Or use Qube Manager:

dom0 → Qube Manager → right-click 'whonix-workstation-17-dvm' → left-click 'Shutdown qube'

The changes will be available when the Disposable is restarted.

Delete a Disposable Template

If a Disposable Template has been customized and it is necessary to revert these changes, a Disposable Template can be deleted the same way as any other VM.

Note the Disposable Template cannot be deleted while it is the default Disposable of another VM, otherwise an error message appears. In that case, follow tips found here on how to manually change the default Disposable of VMs to another setting.

dom0 → Qube Manager → right-click 'whonix-workstation-17-dvm' → left-click 'Delete qube'

Keep Tor Browser Up-to-date

To obtain the latest Tor Browser, the simplest method is to use Whonix built-in Tor Browser downloader functionality. Simply update using Tor Browser Downloader by Whonix (tb-updater) in Whonix-Workstation Template (whonix-workstation-17) when performing your usual maintenance updating:

1. Qubes App Launcher

Qubes App Launcher (blue/grey "Q") → whonix-workstation-17 → Xfce Terminal

2. Update the package lists.

Update the package lists.

sudo apt update

3. System upgrade.

sudo apt full-upgrade

4. Tor Browser upgrade.

If Tor Browser has an issue and has not been upgraded, use update-torbrowser to download a new copy.

Launch Tor Browser Downloader by Whonix and follow the instructions.

update-torbrowser --input gui

5. Shutdown the Disposable Template:

If running.

dom0 → Qube Manager → right-click on 'whonix-workstation-17-dvm' → click 'Shutdown qube'

6. Shutdown the Template.

7. Done.

Update a Disposable Template

Changes to the underlying Template (whonix-workstation-17) are detected automatically and the Disposable Template is updated without user intervention. That means package updates that are applied to whonix-workstation-17 are also applied to the whonix-workstation-17-dvm.

Usage

Disposables are well-suited for risky and largely independent activities, like web browsing or opening untrusted files. In contrast, App Qubes might be better suited for activities necessitating file persistence, like email clients with local email storage.

With either kind of VM, Qubes' VM integration tools like secure file copy and secure clipboard ensure that clean, trusted files and text can be easily and safely transferred to trusted VMs (if necessary).

User Tips

Table: Disposable User Tips

Category	Recommendation
Data Storage	In Qubes, it is unrecommended to store any valuable data in an untrusted VM. This perspective is reinforced by the Tor Browser design which similarly does not remember bookmarks or credentials. Best practice is to store sensitive data in an offline vault VM; for instance, when accessing passwords with a password manager. @rustybird has announced a new "split-tor-browser" package that can retrieve urls and credentials from a trusted VM for use in a Disposable's browser. This package is yet to be tested or endorsed by Whonix, but it looks promising.
Disposable Shutdown	A Disposable automatically shuts down when the first user-launched process is terminated. For example, if a new Disposable is created by launching Tor Browser and a user simultaneously starts typing in an editor later on, all this work will be lost after Tor Browser is closed. To avoid this, first launch a terminal in the Disposable and then launch additional applications from the terminal. This way the Disposable is only destroyed after exiting the terminal.
Offline Disposables	Use utmost caution if deciding to re-establish network connectivity for off-line Disposables! No mechanism is currently available to prevent connections to a clearnet NetVM. Non-networked Disposables are useful for opening untrusted files that potentially might try to use the network maliciously. Like all Qubes VMs, the NetVM for a Disposable can be changed dynamically while the VM is still running. Simply set the NetVM to "none" using Qube Manager or the command line interface.
Shortcuts	Disposables can be created directly by launching programs from the application menu using shortcuts; see below for instructions. Disposables can also be spawned by using context-menus or the command line interface in other App Qubes. Refer to the Qubes Disposable documentation for instructions on different methods. Note the relevant warning concerning shortcuts in this chapter ("Spawning Disposables").
Spawning Disposables from other App Qubes	There are several ways to spawn Disposables from App Qubes. In fact, in addition to the dom0 terminal and application menu, users can also spawn Disposables from the App Qube terminal emulator or context-menu. These tools provide a safe and convenient way to open files and email attachments that could contain malicious code. There is also an option to convert potentially dangerous PDFs into trusted PDFs and open it in a Disposable. The most commonly used methods to spawn Disposables from App Qubes are listed below. It is recommended to read the "Spawning Disposables" warning detailing Disposable network settings before proceeding: Context-menu Thunar file manager - open file in Disposable: File → Actions → Edit/View in Disposable Thunar file manager - open file in Disposable: File → Edit/View in Disposable Thunderbird E-mail client - open email attachment in Disposable: Email → Attachments → Open in Disposable Command line interface - open file in Disposable:qvm-open-in-dvm <file_name>

Add a Desktop Shortcut

1. From the Qubes application menu, drag and drop a menu item onto the desktop.
2. Double-click the newly created launcher to start it.
3. At first start, it is safe to click "Mark Executable".

Add an Xfce4 Panel Shortcut

From the Qubes application menu, drag and drop the menu item onto the panel.

Start Tor Browser in a Disposable

Tor Browser can be started via the GUI or on the command line.

If you are using a GUI.

Qubes App Launcher (blue/grey "Q") → Disposable: whonix-workstation-17-dvm → Tor Browser (AnonDist)

If you are using a terminal.

qvm-run --dispvm=whonix-workstation-17-dvm torbrowser

After launch, always first check the Tor Browser version!

Figure: Tor Browser in Qubes-Whonix Disposable

Start Terminal Emulator in a Disposable

Terminal emulator xfce4-terminal can be started via the GUI or on the command line.

If you are using a GUI, complete the following steps.

Qubes App Launcher (blue/grey "Q") → Disposable: whonix-workstation-17-dvm → Xfce Terminal

If you are using a terminal, complete the following steps.

qvm-run --dispvm=whonix-workstation-17-dvm xfce4-terminal

TODO

• TODO document how to use multiple Disposable Templates - https://forums.whonix.org/t/is-anyone-interested-in-using-multiple-dvm-templates-based-on-whonix-ws-dvm/5757/5

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